We consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs. For games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. With this characterization, we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs. For the case where the players have the same discount factor, we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer. For the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer, we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: C72, C78, D70.
INTRODUCTION
In their seminal contribution, Baron and Ferejohn [2] present a simple sequential model of multilateral bargaining with majority rule. The game they consider is a standard``divide the dollar'' game where n risk neutral players are randomly selected or``recognized'' to make proposals as to how to divide a fixed cake and agreement requires the consent of a simple majority. Baron and Ferejohn [2] show that any division of the cake can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least 5 players and the (common) rate at which players discount future payoffs is sufficiently high. In light of this result, they restrict attention to stationary strategies. While in their model they allow for the probabilities with which players are selected to be the proposer to differ, they only establish the doi:10.1006Âjeth.2001.2820, available online at http:ÂÂwww.idealibrary.com on 11 0022-0531Â01 35.00 uniqueness of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium when these recognition probabilities are restricted to be the same. 2 Baron and Ferejohn [2] also show with an example that when the players have different probabilities of being selected as proposer, the equilibrium need not be unique. In particular, they construct an example with a continuum of equilibria. However, in this example all the equilibria yield the same payoffs.
In this paper, we extend the Baron and Ferejohn [2] model to general q-quota agreement rules and allow the discount factors to differ across players. We show that, for general recognition probabilities, the vector of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs is unique. The model we consider is a special case of Banks and Duggan [1] , who establish the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are risk averse. Note, however, that the uniqueness result obtained here does not necessarily extend to the more general environment as shown by Banks and Duggan [1] .
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model and define the basic concepts. In Section 3, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria. In Section 4, we establish the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria. In Section 5, we establish certain monotonicity properties of the equilibrium payoffs. We show that, when the players have a common discount factor, the equilibrium payoffs are monotone nondecreasing in the recognition probabilities. Furthermore, for the case where the players have equal recognition probabilities, we show that the equilibrium payoffs are monotone nondecreasing in the discount factors. In Section 6, we prove the uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs.
MODEL
We consider a sequential bargaining game with complete information, linear preferences and q-quota majority rule. The model is as follows. Let N=[1, ..., n] denote the set of players with typical elements i and j, where n 2. The players are to distribute a unit of perfectly divisible cake among themselves. Let X denote the set of feasible allocations, that is,
, where x i denotes the cake share for player i. We assume each player has a linear utility function that depends on his cake share only. We also assume that players discount the future and we let $ i <1 denote player i 's discount factor.
The game is played as follows. At date 0, player i is selected as the proposer with probability p i >0, n i=1 p i =1. We will refer to p i as the recognition probability of player i. Upon his recognition, player i offers an allocation in X. Each player sequentially responds by either accepting or rejecting the proposal. If at least q # [1, ..., n] people including the proposer accept the proposal, the game ends and the cake is shared according to the accepted proposal. If not, the process moves to date 1 and the procedure is repeated except that a new proposer may be selected. This process continues until an allocation is accepted. If x # X is accepted at date t # [0, 1, ...], player i 's payoff is given by $ t i x i . If no allocation is ever accepted, each player receives a payoff of zero.
The rest of the section describes the solution concept that we use. Let h t denote the past history (identity of previous proposers, what proposals they made, how each player voted for these proposals) together with the identity of the current proposer and the proposal he made if he made one. A feasible action for player i at date t is denoted by a t i (h t ). Given any set S, let 2(S) denote the set of probability measures on S. When i is the proposer a , and a strategy profile s is an n-tuple of strategies, one for each player.
A strategy profile is subgame perfect if and only if no player can benefit by deviating from his strategy at a single date (see for example Fudenberg and Tirole [4] ). A strategy profile is stationary if it does not depend on the current date and past history. A strategy profile is stationary subgame perfect (SSP) if it is stationary and subgame perfect. An SSP outcome and payoff are the outcome and the payoff generated by an SSP strategy profile.
It is well known that in multilateral bargaining games like the one considered here there is multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria even under unanimity rule (see, for example, Sutton [6] ). However, it has also been recognized that stationarity is typically able to select a unique equilibrium (see, for example, Baron and Ferejohn [2] and Merlo and Wilson [5] ). Thus, we restrict our attention to SSP equilibria.
CHARACTERIZATION OF SSP EQUILIBRIA
In this section we characterize the SSP payoffs and strategies.
3 To simplify notation we define M i as the set of n-dimensional real vectors such 13 UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS that the i th component is zero. We also let e # R n denote the n-dimensional unit vector. Finally we let D=[d ij ] denote the n_n diagonal matrix with d ii =$ i . The following theorem characterizes the set of SSP equilibria. Theorem 1. The set of SSP equilibria can be described as follows. Let i # N denote the proposer. Then
with probability f i (# i )
where
and C k is the set of minimizers for the following program
Proof. Let v be a stationary payoff vector. Then the continuation payoff for player i is given by $ i v i . Given a proposal x j by player j, player i{ j will accept the proposal if x j i $ i v i and will reject it if x j i <$ i v i . Suppose now player i is the proposer. Switching the roles of i and j in the argument above, player i needs to give player j at least $ j v j in order to induce acceptance by player j. Since the proposer's payoff is strictly increasing in his own cake share, he will give player j exactly $ j v j to buy player j 's vote.
Note that the proposer needs q&1 votes in addition to his vote in order to induce acceptance of his proposal. Thus, when player i is the proposer, choosing a payoff maximizing proposal that will be accepted is equivalent to solving max 1& :
or equivalently solving the problem (2). Let C i denote the set of minimizers for (2) . Clearly an SSP mixed strategy for players puts positive mass only on the set C i . Note that player i's payoff is the same for all # i # C i and hence he is indifferent as to which q&1 players he pays off. In equilibrium, the probability distributions ( f 1 , ..., f n ) must induce the stationary payoff vector v. Next we show that this is satisfied by (1) .
Consider the situation at the beginning of the current period, before the identity of the proposer has been revealed. With probability p i player i is the proposer, in which case the payoff to him is 1&
given his SSP strategy. With probability p j , player j{i is the proposer in which case the expected payoff to player i is $ i v i # j # C j # ji f j (# j ). Since this is true for all j{i, the right hand side of (1) gives the expected payoff to player i at the beginning of current period before the identity of the proposer is revealed.
The proof follows from the preceding discussion noting that a deviation by players from the strategy described at a single date does not affect the continuation payoffs.
Q.E.D.
Note that given the SSP payoff vector v, an SSP proposal x i by player i can be identified by the (n&1)-dimensional vector
which specifies the players whose votes are bought by player i. Intuitively, under the proposal corresponding to # i , player j{i receives his continuation payoff if # ij =1 and he receives nothing if # ij =0. We define a coalition partner of player i as a player whose vote is bought by player i, that is. a player who receives his continuation payoff when i is the proposer. With the identification above, a stationary (mixed) strategy for player i is a probability distribution f i # 2(C i ). An SSP strategy f i for player i induces offer probabilities r ij = :
where r ij denotes the probability that j is a coalition partner of player i. Thus, we can rewrite (1) in terms of the offer probabilities r ij as
Let r i =(r i 1 , ..., r in ) denote the vector of offer probabilities for player i. Note that # ij =0 for all # i # C i and hence r ii =0 which in turn implies that r i # M i . Let r=(r 1 , ..., r n ) denote the collection of offer probability vectors. Given r, we can write the payoff vector v=(v 1 , ..., v n ) as a fixed point of the operator A( } ; r):
for all i.
The next theorem characterizes the SSP payoffs. The proof of this theorem relies on a lemma (Lemma 1) which is stated and proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. A payoff vector v is SSP if and only if there exists offer probabilities r such that
Proof. By Theorem 1 and the arguments following that, it suffices to show that for all i, r i is a minimizer of (5) if and only if it is induced by an SSP strategy f i for player i.
Recall that C i is the set of minimizers for (2) . Also, note that the constraint set for (5) is the convex hull of constraint set of (2) . Therefore by Lemma 1 in the Appendix, r i solves (5) if and only is it is in the convex hull of C i . Thus, r i solves (5) if and only if there exists a probability distribution f i with support C i such that r ij = :
that is, r i is induced by f i . The probability distributions ( f 1 , ..., f n ) that induce r must also induce v by the hypothesis that v is a fixed point of A( } ; r). Thus, the proof follows.
Note that, any SSP equilibrium proposal can be uniquely identified with a pair (v, r) where v is the equilibrium payoff vector and r is the corresponding offer probability collection. In what follows, we will refer to such a pair as an equilibrium outcome. Also note that, to simplify notation we have suppressed the interdependency between the payoff vector v and offer probability collection r. Since this interdependency plays a crucial role in the argument we use in the next section to establish the existence of equilibria, we will drop this simplification there.
EXISTENCE OF SSP EQUILIBRIA
In this section we prove the existence of SSP equilibria. We show the existence of SSP payoffs in the (n&1)-dimensional unit simplex and in the rest of the paper we show the uniqueness of the SSP payoffs in this set.
Theorem 3. There exists an SSP equilibrium outcome.
Proof. Let rÄ i (v) denote the set of minimizers for problem (5) given v and let rÄ 1 (v)_ } } } _rÄ n (v). By the Theorem of the Maximum, rÄ (v) is upper hemi-continuous, compact valued and nonempty for all v. It can be easily verified that rÄ (v) is convex valued for all v. Also note that, for fixed r, A( } ; r) is a contraction mapping and that maps the (n&1)-dimensional unit simplex to itself. Thus it has a unique fixed point v(r) which is a continuous function of r. Hence the correspondence rÄ b v=1 : 7 Ä 7 defined by
is also compact and convex valued, upper hemi-continuous and nonempty for all r # 7. By Theorem 2, (v(rÄ ), rÄ ) is an SSP equilibrium outcome if and only if rÄ is a fixed point of 1. Hence by Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem the result follows.
MONOTONICITY OF SSP PAYOFFS
In this section, we show that any SSP payoff vector must satisfy certain monotonicity conditions. These conditions are used in the next section to establish the uniqueness of SSP payoffs. Furthermore, we show that, when the players have a common discount factor, if player i 's recognition probability is not larger than player j 's, then his payoff cannot be larger than player j 's payoff. Similarly, when the players have equal recognition probabilities, if player i's discount factor is not larger than player j 's, then his payoff cannot be larger than player j 's payoff.
Given an SSP payoff vector v, let w i denote the optimized value of the objective function of (5), which is also equal to the optimized value of the objective function of (2) . Intuitively w i is the sum of the cake shares disbursed by player i to his coalition partners in order to reach agreement on his proposal. i.e. w i is the cost of the cheapest coalition when i is the proposer. We refer to w i as the disbursement by player i and to the vector w=(w 1 , ..., w n ) as a disbursement vector.
To simplify the notation, let + i be defined as
that is, + i is the probability that player i is in the winning coalition when he is not the proposer. Note that, by definition, 0 + i 1& p i , and hence,
for all i # N. Let +=(+ 1 , ..., + n ). As before, we economize on notation and suppress the dependency of w and + on the payoff vector v. Rearranging (3) and using the definitions of w i and + i we can write v i as
or equivalently,
Throughout this section we enumerate N as [i 1 , ..., i n ] such that
This enumeration implies that there are (at least) q&1 players whose, votes are not more expensive than player i q 's vote. Hence, in deciding
In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold. First,
and
This follows immediately from the fact that, for each player k # N, r k solves (5). The intuition behind the condition is as follows. Let j be a player such that $ j v j <$ i q v i q . Let k{ j be the proposer and consider the situation faced by the proposer. To induce the acceptance of his proposal he needs to buy the votes of the least costly q&1 other players by offering them their continuation payoffs. Since $ j v j <$ i q v i q , player j is in this group with certainty. Thus, the offer probability of player j is always 1 for all k{ j. Since player j is always in the winning coalition when he does not propose, and since the probability that he does not propose is 1& p j , the probability that he is in the winning coalition when someone else proposes is 1& p j . On the other hand, if $ j v j >$ i q v i q , any proposer k{ j can do better by not buying the vote of player j as there are always q&1 other votes that are cheaper to buy. That is, the probability that player j is in the winning coalition when someone else proposes is 0. Note that, by (9) + j >0 implies $ j v j $ i q v i q , and
Second,
To understand this condition, note that, given the ordering $ i q v i 1 } } } $ i n v i n of the payoffs, the votes of players i 1 , ..., i q&1 are always the cheapest to buy. Hence, the disbursement by player j, for j=i q , ..., i n , is Third, using (9) and (10), we can write (7) as
To see this condition holds in equilibrium, note that,
Rearranging, we obtain (13). 
The result follows since 1&$ j + p j $ j <1. If, on the other hand, $ j v j =$ i q v i q then, by (11) and (12),
which the desired result follows immediately.
(ii) If $ k v k <$ i q v i q , then the result follows immediately, since by (11),
If, on the other hand, $ k v k =$ i q v i q , then, from (12) and (13),
which implies the desired result.
(iii) Let p j $ j p k $ k and suppose on the contrary
Then, by (11) and (12)
But then p j $ j >p k $ k . This contradiction proves the result.
(iv) Let
which is a contradiction. If, instead, $ j v j >$ i q v i q , then, by (12) and (13),
Rearranging the above expression, we obtain
contradiction. The proof follows by contradiction of both possible cases.
Note that, when the players have a common discount factor, p j $ j p k $ k if and only if
and both of these conditions are equivalent to p j p k . Thus, parts (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 4 imply that when the players have a common discount factor, the SSP payoffs are monotone nondecreasing in the recognition probabilities. Similarly, when the players have equal recognition probabilities, p j $ j p k $ k if and only if
and both of these conditions are equivalent to $ j $ k . Thus, parts (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 4 imply that when the players have equal recognition probabilities, the SSP payoffs are monotone nondecreasing in the discount factors. The following example illustrates that when the discount factor is the same, the players can have equal SSP payoffs even if their recognition probabilities are different. There are 3 players, a common discount factor $=0.95, recognition probabilities p 1 =0.45, p 2 =0.4, and p 3 =0.15, and the agreement rule is majority rule. In this example v i =1Â3, i=1, 2, 3. Deriving the necessary conditions for the strict monotonicity of the SSP payoffs in the recognition probabilities is complicated even when there are only three players. The following is an example of sufficient conditions for strict monotonicity. All players have a common discount factor $, and the recognition probabilities are p 1 , for player 1, and (1& 
UNIQUENESS OF SSP PAYOFFS
In this section, we prove the uniqueness of SSP payoff vectors. Baron and Ferejohn [2] , show with an example that the equilibrium outcome need not be unique. We will show that if there are multiple SSP outcomes they all yield the same SSP payoff vectors. Since the SSP payoff is unique whenever the SSP outcome is unique, we will only consider the case where there are at least two equilibrium outcomes.
Throughout the rest of the paper, let (v, r) and (vÄ , rÄ ) be two SSP equilibrium outcomes such that r{rÄ . Let w and w Ä denote the corresponding disbursement vectors, and for any player i, let + i and +Ä i denote the corresponding probabilities of being in the winning coalition when some other player is the proposer.
From (7), we see that, given his recognition probability, the payoff to a player depends only on two factors: the probability that he is in the winning coalition when someone else proposes and his disbursement when he is the proposer. Hence, we start by comparing how the payoff to a player changes when one or both of these factors change. The results of these comparisons are contained in Lemmata 2 8 and Corollary 3, that are stated and proved in the Appendix.
First note that, if a player is in the winning coalition with a higher probability when he is not the proposer, and if he also pays less to buy votes when lie is the proposer, he cannot be worse off (Lemma 2). Moreover, any favorable change in his disbursement implies an increase in a player's payoff even if his probability of being in the winning coalition decreases (Lemma 6).
The second result may appear counterintuitive by examining the payoff Eq. (7) for one player only. The proof relies on two observations. First, the players can be enumerated as [1, ..., n] so that the first q&1 players' votes are relatively cheap compared to player q's vote and the last n&q players' votes are relatively expensive compared to player q's vote (Lemma 4). This implies that the probabilities of being in the winning coalition cannot change``much'': if a player's vote is strictly cheaper than player q's vote in one equilibrium (so that he is always in the winning coalition when someone else proposes), it cannot be strictly more expensive than player q's vote in another equilibrium (so that he is never in the winning coalition when someone else proposes). Second, a strict decline in the probability of being in the winning coalition implies that another player is in the winning coalition with a strictly higher probability (Lemma 5). Hence, if a player is in the winning coalition with a strictly lower probability, then his payoff must have increased.
Therefore, we conclude that if the disbursement for a player does not change, then his payoff cannot change either (Corollary 3). In other words, in order to establish the uniqueness of SSP payoffs, it is sufficient to show that the disbursement vector does not change (i.e., the disbursement by each player is the same in any two equilibria).
Next, note that the disbursements by any two players change in the same direction (Lemma 8). The proof of this result relies on the following two observations. First, the difference between the disbursements of any two players is either zero or is equal to the difference between their discounted payoffs. Second, an increase in the payoff of a player (which, by Lemma 2 and Lemma 6, is possible only when his disbursement decreases) is less than the decrease in his disbursement (Lemma 7). Then, if the disbursements by two players change in the opposite direction, the change cannot be supported with the (smaller) change in the corresponding payoffs. Hence, in order to show the uniqueness of SSP payoffs, it is sufficient to show that the disbursement by any arbitrarily chosen player does not change.
Without loss of generality (see Lemma 4) we assume
In particular,
We can now prove the uniqueness of SSP payoffs.
Theorem 5. If (v, r) and (vÄ , rÄ ) are two SSP equilibrium outcomes then v=vÄ .
Proof. By Corollary 3 and Lemma 8, it suffices to prove that w Ä q =w q . Suppose not and without loss of generality assume that w Ä q >w q . Then, by Lemma 8, for all i # N, w Ä i >w i . In particular, for i=1, ..., q&1, w Ä i >w i . But by Lemma 7, this implies that vÄ i <v i for all i=1, ..., q&1, which in turn implies that w Ä q = q&1 i
This contradiction proves the desired result.
APPENDIX
Lemma 1. Consider the problems min f (x) (14)
x # S where f is linear, S is finite and S is the convex hull of S. Let X denote the set of minimizers for (14) and X denote the set of minimizers for (15). Then X is the convex hull of X.
Proof. Let K(X) denote convex hull of X. Note that K(X)/S and f is linear implies K(X)/X . Thus, it suffices to prove that X /K(X).
Let [x, ..., x m ] be an enumeration of S and for some k m, without loss of generality, let [x 1 , ..., x k ] be an enumeration of X. Suppose xÄ is a minimizer for (15). Then xÄ # X /S . Since S is the convex hull of S, there exists :=(: 1 , ..., : m ) with the property that : i 0 for all i,
.., k and j=k+1, ..., m. Thus it must be the case that : j =0 for all j=k+1, ..., m for otherwise xÄ does not minimize (15), but then xÄ # K(X).
All Proof. By (7),
The proof follows immediately by noting that at least one of the inequalities in the above expression is strict if
Proof. If v i >vÄ i , there is nothing to prove. Suppose v i vÄ i . Then, by (7),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that +Ä i + i , and the second inequality follows from (6) . The result follows immediately since the first inequality is strict if +Ä i <+ i and the second inequality is strict if w i >w Ä i . Q.E.D.
and let [ j 1 , ..., j n ] be an enumeration of N such that
(ii) There exists k # N such that $ k v k =$ i q v i q , and $ k vÄ k =$ j q vÄ j q .
Proof. (i) Suppose the assertion is not true. Then, there exist k and k$ such that
but then
of Theorem 4, leading to a contradiction.
(ii) Partition N as.
Similarly, define N 1 , N 2 and N 3 by replacing v with vÄ and i q with j q .
By part (i) of the Lemma, without loss of generality, we can assume that, for all
Suppose the assertion of part (ii) of the Lemma is not true, i.e., N 2 & N 2 =<. Then, it must be the case that N 2 $N 1 . In particular $ i q vÄ i q <$ j q vÄ j q .
Note that N 1 & N 2 . If this were not the case, then there would exist a k # N such that
but (16) implies
and (17) implies
it must be the case that N 1 _ N 2 N 1 . But, by definition, *(N 1 _ N 2 ) q and *N 1 q&1, leading to a contradiction.
Lemma 5. Without loss of generality, assume that, for all i q, $ i v i $ q v q and $ i vÄ i $ q vÄ q , and for all i q, $ i v i $ q v q and $ i vÄ i $ q vÄ q . Then, for all i # N, if + i >+Ä i , then there exists j # N with + j <+Ä j such that
Furthermore, if any of the inequalities in (18) is strict, both of the inequalities in (19) hold with equality. Similarly, if any of the inequalities in (19) is strict, both of the inequalities in (18) hold with equality.
Proof. Let i # N be given. Since + i >+Ä i there must exist at least one player j # N with + j <+Ä j , for otherwise at least one player k is not solving (5).
Since + i >+Ä i 0, it must be the case that $ i v i $ q v q , for otherwise, + i =0 by (9). Also, 1& p i + i >+Ä i implies $ i vÄ i $ q vÄ q by (9) again. By a similar argument, we obtain $ j v j $ q v q and $ j vÄ j $ q vÄ q .
Notice that, if either of the inequalities in (18) is strict, then both of the inequalities of (19) hold with equality. To see, first suppose $ j v j >$ q v q . Then, j>q and hence, $ j vÄ j $ q vÄ q , which is possible only if the second inequality of (19) is not strict. If also $ i vÄ j >$ q vÄ q , we obtain a contradiction using part (i) of Theorem 4.
Next suppose, $ i v i <$ q v q . This implies that i<q, and hence, $ i vÄ i $ q vÄ q , which is only possible if the first inequality of (19) is not strict. If, in addition, $ j vÄ j <$ q vÄ q , we obtain a contradiction using part (ii) of Theorem 4.
By a similar argument, if any of the inequalities in (19) is strict, both of the inequalities of (18) must hold with equality.
Lemma 6. Without loss of generality, assume that, for all i q, $ i v i $ q v q and $ i vÄ i $ q vÄ q , and for all i q, $ i v i $ q v q , and $ i vÄ i $ q vÄ q . Then, for all i # N, if + i >+Ä i and w i w Ä i , then v i vÄ i . The inequality is strict if w i {w Ä i .
Proof. Since + i >+Ä i by Lemma 5 there exists a player j such that + j <+Ä j ; and (18) and (19) hold. Also, by Lemma 5, there are two possible cases.
and the result follows. Suppose v j vÄ j . Then it must be the case that w j w Ä j , for otherwise by Lemma 2 2v j <vÄ j , a contradiction.
By (10),
and hence
The term in the brackets on the right hand side is nonnegative by Lemma 3 and (w q &w Ä q ) is nonnegative since w q =q i w Ä i =w Ä q . The result follows by noting that
Then it must be the case that w j w Ä j , for otherwise Lemma 2 implies that v j <vÄ j , a contradiction.
Since +Ä j >+ j , w Ä j w j and vÄ j <v j , by Lemma 3, we obtain
Also, note that by (10),
The right hand side of this inequality is strictly positive since, (w Ä q &w q )>$ j (v j &vÄ j ) $ q (v q &vÄ q ). Hence, the result follows. Q.E.D. Proof. We first prove that the inequalities hold and then show that they are strict only if w i >w Ä i . (That the inequalities are strict if w i >w Ä i will follow from Lemmata 2, 3 and 6 wherever they are used in the proof.) That 0 vÄ i &v i follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 6. Thus, it suffices to show that vÄ i &v i w i &w Ä i .
If + i +Ä i , then vÄ i &v i w i &w Ä i by Lemma 6 and Lemma 3. Suppose + i <+Ä i . Since + i <+Ä i , by Lemma 5 there exists a player j such that + j >+Ä j and there are two possible cases. Case 1. $ j vÄ j $ q vÄ q $ i vÄ i and $ i v i =$ q v q =$ j v j . By (10) w j =w q =w i and w Ä i w Ä q =w Ä j . Then, w j w Ä j . Since also + j >+Ä j , by Lemma 6 and Lemma 3, 0 vÄ j &v j w j &w Ä j . Notice that w j &w Ä j =w q &w Ä q and vÄ j &v j $ j (vÄ j &v j ) $ q (vÄ q &v q ). Hence, w q &w Ä q $ q (vÄ q &v q ). Also, by (10) w i &w Ä i =[(w q &w Ä q )&$ q (vÄ q &v q )]+$ i (vÄ i &v i ).
The result follows since the term in the brackets is nonnegative.
Case 2. $ j vÄ j =$ q vÄ q =$ i vÄ i and $ i v i $ q v q $ j v j . By (10) w j w q =w i and w Ä i =w Ä j =w Ä q . Then, w j w Ä j . Since also + j >+Ä j by Lemma 6 and Lemma 3, 0 vÄ j &v j w j &w Ä j .
Using (10) The result follows by noting that the term in the brackets is nonnegative. To see that the inequalities are strict only if w i >w Ä i , notice that, if w i =w Ä i , then 0 vÄ i &v i w i &w Ä i =0 which in turn implies that neither inequality can be strict.
Lemma 8. Without loss of generality, assume that, for all i q, $ i v i $ q v q , and $ i vÄ i $ q vÄ q , and for all i q, $ i v i $ q v q and $ i vÄ i $ q vÄ q . Then, for all i # N, w i w Ä i if w q w Ä q . The inequality is strict if and only if w q >w Ä q .
Proof. If i q, the proof follows immediately by (10), since $ i v i $ q v q , and $ i vÄ i $ q vÄ q . So, let i<q. Then, $ i v i $ q v q , and $ i vÄ i $ q vÄ q and hence, from (10)
where the inequality follows from Lemma 7 and is strict if and only if w q >w Ä q . Now if w i <w Ä i , then, by Lemma 7, 0<v i &vÄ i <w Ä i &w i and by (20) w Ä i &w i $ i (v i &vÄ i ) v i &vÄ i , a contradiction. Hence, w i w Ä i and the inequality is strict if w q >w Ä q by (20). Finally, if w q =w Ä q , then vÄ q =v q and hence, by (20), w i &w Ä i =$ i (vÄ i &v i ) vÄ i &v i , which is possible only if w i =w Ä i .
